Loading...
Canada deserves to know.
Loading...
Bell, Rogers, and Telus — plus the flanker brands they own — control roughly 90% of Canadian wireless. That dominance was constructed: foreign-ownership rules walled out deep-pocketed competitors, and every domestic challenger Ottawa seeded since 2008 was eventually bought by the companies it was created to challenge. Three federal governments, two regulators, and one Competition Bureau court fight have tried to break the pattern. The scoreboard: prices finally fell for two years — and as of late 2025, Statistics Canada says they're rising again. New CRTC switching-fee bans take effect June 12.
Canadians commonly call it the cell phone monopoly. Technically it is an oligopoly: Bell, Rogers, and Telus, together with the flanker brands they own — Fido, Chatr and Cityfone (Rogers), Koodo and Public Mobile (Telus), Virgin Plus and Lucky Mobile (Bell) — control roughly 90% of the Canadian wireless market. This article traces how that happened: the Telecommunications Act's foreign-ownership rules (the "80/80 rule" plus the 10% market-share rule) that keep foreign carriers from competing at scale; the 2008 AWS spectrum auction in which Ottawa set aside spectrum to create new competitors (Wind Mobile, Mobilicity, Public Mobile); and the decade in which every one of those entrants was absorbed — Public Mobile by Telus (2013), Mobilicity by Rogers (2015), Wind by Shaw (2016, renamed Freedom Mobile), Manitoba's MTS by Bell (2017), and finally Shaw itself by Rogers in a $26-billion merger completed in 2023. The article catalogues who has actually fought back: the Harper Conservatives' 2013 attempt to recruit Verizon (defeated by the Big Three's "Fair for Canada" lobbying campaign and Verizon's withdrawal); the NDP's price-cap pledges under Jagmeet Singh; the Competition Bureau's full-scale legal war against the Rogers-Shaw merger (lost at the Competition Tribunal in December 2022 and at the Federal Court of Appeal in January 2023); Industry Minister François-Philippe Champagne's extracted conditions (Vidéotron must hold Freedom Mobile for 10 years and price Ontario/Western plans comparably to its Quebec plans, roughly 20% below incumbent levels); and the CRTC's consumer-protection turn, including the fee bans taking effect June 12, 2026 that the regulator estimates will save Canadians more than $600 million per year. The honest scoreboard: CRTC-measured wireless prices fell roughly 25% over two years after the Vidéotron remedy — and in October and November 2025, Statistics Canada recorded the first year-over-year cellular price increases in about 30 months, suggesting the competitive window opened by the merger remedies may already be narrowing.
Call it what most Canadians call it: the cell phone monopoly. Technically, it's an oligopoly — and the distinction matters because the structure is the story.
Bell, Rogers, and Telus, together with the brands they own, control **roughly 90%** of the Canadian wireless market. The store-shelf "competition" is mostly the same three companies wearing different costumes:
- **Rogers** owns Fido, Chatr, and Cityfone. - **Telus** owns Koodo and Public Mobile. - **Bell** owns Virgin Plus and Lucky Mobile.
A Canadian comparison-shopping between Fido, Koodo, and Virgin is comparing three subsidiaries of the three incumbents. The flanker-brand strategy lets the Big Three compete for price-sensitive customers without lowering the parent brands' prices — the discount brand absorbs the price-shopper, and the premium brand keeps its margin.
The one major exception is **Freedom Mobile**, owned by Quebecor's Vidéotron — and as this article documents, Freedom exists in its current form only because the federal government forced Rogers to sell it as the price of swallowing Shaw.
Our June 4 piece on the streaming tax documented the architecture in detail; here is the short version.
Under the Telecommunications Act and Radiocommunication Act, a Canadian carrier with **10% or more market share** must be Canadian-controlled: at least **80% of voting shares Canadian-owned and 80% of board members Canadian citizens** — the "80/80 rule." The rules were loosened in 2012, but only for small players below the 10% threshold.
The practical effect: AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile, or any other deep-pocketed foreign carrier cannot buy one of the Big Three, and cannot build a challenger past 10% market share without surrendering control of it. Foreign competition at the scale that would actually discipline Big Three pricing is structurally foreclosed.
The one moment the wall was tested: in 2013, **Verizon explored entering Canada** — looking at acquiring the struggling new entrants and bidding in the 700 MHz spectrum auction. The Harper government openly welcomed it. The Big Three responded with the coordinated **"Fair for Canada" advertising and lobbying campaign**, framing the second-largest carrier in the United States as a threat to Canadian jobs and rural networks. Within months, Verizon walked. No foreign carrier of comparable scale has looked at Canada since.
Ottawa has understood the competition problem for at least 18 years — and tried to fix it by manufacturing a fourth carrier. The 2008 AWS spectrum auction **set aside spectrum that incumbents could not bid on**, and three new carriers launched on it in 2009-2010: **Wind Mobile, Mobilicity, and Public Mobile**.
Here is what happened to every one of them:
- **Public Mobile** — sold to **Telus**, October 2013. Telus now uses the name as a flanker brand. - **Mobilicity** — filed for creditor protection in 2013 after a blocked Telus deal; sold to **Rogers** in 2015. - **Wind Mobile** — sold to **Shaw** in 2016 and renamed Freedom Mobile. - **MTS (Manitoba Telecom Services)** — not a 2008 entrant but Manitoba's independent fourth carrier, whose presence made Manitoba one of Canada's cheapest wireless provinces. Sold to **Bell** in 2017. Manitoba's discount eroded. - **Shaw itself** — acquired by **Rogers** in the $26-billion merger completed in April 2023, with Freedom Mobile divested to Vidéotron as the regulatory price.
The pattern is total. Every carrier created or sustained as a check on the Big Three was eventually acquired by the Big Three or consolidated into the existing oligopoly structure. The set-aside policy succeeded at creating competitors and failed completely at keeping them alive.
The operator-class answer to "is any politician fighting this?" is: several have tried, from every major party, plus both watchdogs. The record:
**The Harper Conservatives (2008-2014).** The 2008 spectrum set-asides were their policy. In 2013 they actively courted Verizon and ran on "More choices, lower prices." They lost — not to an opposition party, but to the Big Three's lobbying campaign and Verizon's cost-benefit math.
**The NDP (2019-2021).** Jagmeet Singh campaigned twice on **capping cell phone and internet prices**, pegging Canadian rates to global averages and mandating affordable basic plans. The NDP never held government; the pledge was never tested.
**The Competition Bureau (2021-2023).** Commissioner Matthew Boswell took the Rogers-Shaw merger to a full Competition Tribunal hearing — the most aggressive merger challenge in the Bureau's modern history. The Tribunal ruled against the Bureau in December 2022; the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal in January 2023. The watchdog used every legal tool it had, and lost.
**François-Philippe Champagne (Liberal, Industry Minister).** Approved the merger — but extracted binding conditions: **Vidéotron must hold Freedom Mobile for at least 10 years** and must offer prices in Ontario and Western Canada **comparable to its Quebec pricing, roughly 20% below incumbent levels**. Whatever one thinks of approving the merger, the conditions are the single policy act of the last decade that demonstrably moved national prices.
**The CRTC (2021-present).** Opened wholesale MVNO access to regional carriers; opened incumbent fibre networks to competitors in February 2025; and in March 2026 issued Telecom Regulatory Policy 2026-43, which **bans activation fees, plan-change fees, and most early-cancellation fees effective June 12, 2026** — two days after this article publishes. The CRTC estimates the switching-friction rules will save Canadians **more than $600 million per year**.
Did any of it work? Honestly: partially, recently, and possibly temporarily.
**The win.** After the Freedom-to-Vidéotron divestiture, a genuine price war broke out. CRTC data shows mobile prices on popular tiers **fell roughly 25-40% between 2023 and 2025**. The gap to U.S. pricing narrowed. This is the most sustained price decline in modern Canadian wireless history, and it traces directly to the Champagne conditions — a fourth carrier with mandated Quebec-level pricing, finally national.
**The turn.** In **October and November 2025**, Statistics Canada's CPI recorded **year-over-year cellular price increases — the first in roughly 30 months**. StatCan attributes it to weaker seasonal discounting; analysts are blunter. Ivey Business School's Erik Bohlin: the competitive period is "stabilizing." The Canadian Anti-Monopoly Project's Keldon Bester: the competitive moment may prove "more temporary than we would like."
Two structural facts support the pessimists. First, the subscriber-growth engine that fuelled the price war — record immigration — has slowed, reducing the incentive to compete for new customers. Second, the Vidéotron pricing condition runs **10 years from 2023**. In 2033 it expires. Nothing in current law prevents the market from re-converging on oligopoly pricing afterward — and the entire 18-year history above suggests that is the default trajectory, not the tail risk.
Six days ago we published [the streaming-tax article](/news/streaming-tax-40-per-service-wireless-protectionism-parallel), which used Canadian wireless as the historical warning for the CRTC's new 15% streaming levy: protect a market from foreign competition, and consumers pay the differential.
This deep-dive sharpens that warning in one important way. The wireless story is not just "protection caused high prices." It is **"protection plus consolidation defeated every remedy."** Ottawa did not ignore the wireless problem — it attacked it repeatedly, across three governments and two decades, with spectrum set-asides, foreign-entry overtures, merger litigation, ministerial conditions, and regulatory fee bans. Almost every remedy was absorbed, outlasted, or out-lobbied by the incumbents. The single remedy that moved prices — the Vidéotron conditions — is time-limited and already showing strain in the CPI data.
Applied to streaming: the federal government has told the CRTC to revisit the 15% levy because of consumer-cost concerns. The wireless record says revisits, conditions, and consumer-protection rules tend to soften protected-market pricing only temporarily, while the underlying structure — who is allowed to compete — stays untouched. Watch the structure, not the press release.
One more parallel worth naming: in both files, the consumer-cost concession came only after the policy was locked in. In wireless, Ottawa spent years denying the price gap that its own department's studies later documented. In streaming, the government acknowledged the pass-through risk only after the CRTC had finalized the rate. The pattern is consistent: the price tag is admitted late, and paid by the same people both times.
On the documented record:
- Canada's wireless market is roughly 90% controlled by three companies and their flanker brands. - The dominance was constructed by identifiable policy: foreign-ownership rules that wall out competitors at scale, and a merger-review system that ultimately approved every major consolidation put in front of it. - Politicians and watchdogs from every major party have fought it — Harper's set-asides and Verizon overture, Singh's price-cap pledges, the Competition Bureau's two-court war, Champagne's merger conditions, the CRTC's fee bans landing June 12. - The one remedy that worked — a mandated, price-conditioned fourth carrier — has an expiry date of 2033, and the price data already turned upward in late 2025.
The next chapter is being written now: whether the CRTC's June 12 switching rules let consumers punish price increases, whether the Carney government extends or strengthens the Vidéotron conditions before they lapse, and whether anyone in Parliament is willing to touch the foreign-ownership wall itself — the one structural lever no government has pulled.
Parliament Audit will track all three. Your MP's position on telecom competition is a matter of public record — [find yours](/find-your-mp).
On May 21, 2026, the CRTC tripled the contribution rate foreign streaming services must pay to Canadian-content funds — from 5% to 15% of Canadian revenues. Analysts estimate the pass-through to consumers at $1.50 to $4.00 per service per month, or roughly $18 to $48 per service per year. The federal government has itself acknowledged the cost will likely fall on Canadian consumers. Canada has run this experiment before: in wireless. The Telecommunications Act's foreign-ownership rules effectively blocked U.S. carriers like AT&T and Verizon from competing here. The result is documented: some of the highest cell phone prices in the developed world. This article walks both regimes and what the wireless precedent tells us about the streaming one.
Canada is the world's fourth-largest oil producer and hasn't built a major new refinery since 1984. We export 98% of our crude to one customer — the United States, which now tariffs it at 10% — much of it at a structural discount, and then re-import refined gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. The British Columbia loop is the starkest version: Alberta crude flows down the Trans Mountain pipeline to Washington State refineries, and tankers carry the gasoline back to Vancouver. Here is the documented anatomy of the refining gap — including the honest economics of why it exists.
Tax Freedom Day is the day the average Canadian family finally finishes paying its annual tax bill and starts working for itself. In 2026, that day is June 9 — one day later than 2025, and almost two months later than 1961. The Fraser Institute's breakdown of the $72,539 bill: $25,352 in income tax, $17,069 in payroll and health taxes, $10,519 in sales tax, $7,819 in corporate tax passed through in prices, $4,939 in property tax, plus fuel, carbon, liquor, tobacco, amusement, import, and natural-resource levies. The chart shows every line.
About this article
Parliament Audit is non-partisan and does not endorse or oppose any legislation. This article is based on publicly available legislative documents and parliamentary records; all sources are linked above.
AI-assisted, human-edited. AI tools help us ingest parliamentary records and draft analysis; an editor reviews every article and verifies key facts against primary sources before publication. Quotation marks are reserved for verbatim text from a primary source. See our methodology and corrections log.
Your MP votes on this. Their constituency inbox is the most-read channel for feedback on bills in committee.
You're welcome to run this article in full on your newsroom, blog, newsletter, or paper. Keep the byline and the link back to parliamentaudit.ca. See the full terms.
<!-- Parliament Audit — republished under CC BY-ND 4.0 -->
<article>
<h1>Canada's Cell Phone "Monopoly" Is Actually Three Companies, and It Wasn't an Accident. Ottawa Helped Build It — Then Spent 18 Years Trying and Failing to Build a Fourth Carrier.</h1>
<p><em>By Parliament Audit · June 10, 2026 · 8 min read</em></p>
<p><strong>Canadians commonly call it the cell phone monopoly. Technically it is an oligopoly: Bell, Rogers, and Telus, together with the flanker brands they own — Fido, Chatr and Cityfone (Rogers), Koodo and Public Mobile (Telus), Virgin Plus and Lucky Mobile (Bell) — control roughly 90% of the Canadian wireless market. This article traces how that happened: the Telecommunications Act's foreign-ownership rules (the "80/80 rule" plus the 10% market-share rule) that keep foreign carriers from competing at scale; the 2008 AWS spectrum auction in which Ottawa set aside spectrum to create new competitors (Wind Mobile, Mobilicity, Public Mobile); and the decade in which every one of those entrants was absorbed — Public Mobile by Telus (2013), Mobilicity by Rogers (2015), Wind by Shaw (2016, renamed Freedom Mobile), Manitoba's MTS by Bell (2017), and finally Shaw itself by Rogers in a $26-billion merger completed in 2023. The article catalogues who has actually fought back: the Harper Conservatives' 2013 attempt to recruit Verizon (defeated by the Big Three's "Fair for Canada" lobbying campaign and Verizon's withdrawal); the NDP's price-cap pledges under Jagmeet Singh; the Competition Bureau's full-scale legal war against the Rogers-Shaw merger (lost at the Competition Tribunal in December 2022 and at the Federal Court of Appeal in January 2023); Industry Minister François-Philippe Champagne's extracted conditions (Vidéotron must hold Freedom Mobile for 10 years and price Ontario/Western plans comparably to its Quebec plans, roughly 20% below incumbent levels); and the CRTC's consumer-protection turn, including the fee bans taking effect June 12, 2026 that the regulator estimates will save Canadians more than $600 million per year. The honest scoreboard: CRTC-measured wireless prices fell roughly 25% over two years after the Vidéotron remedy — and in October and November 2025, Statistics Canada recorded the first year-over-year cellular price increases in about 30 months, suggesting the competitive window opened by the merger remedies may already be narrowing.</strong></p>
<h2>What Canadians call the monopoly is actually three companies — and their costumes</h2>
<p>Call it what most Canadians call it: the cell phone monopoly. Technically, it's an oligopoly — and the distinction matters because the structure is the story.</p>
<p>Bell, Rogers, and Telus, together with the brands they own, control **roughly 90%** of the Canadian wireless market. The store-shelf "competition" is mostly the same three companies wearing different costumes:</p>
<p>- **Rogers** owns Fido, Chatr, and Cityfone.
- **Telus** owns Koodo and Public Mobile.
- **Bell** owns Virgin Plus and Lucky Mobile.</p>
<p>A Canadian comparison-shopping between Fido, Koodo, and Virgin is comparing three subsidiaries of the three incumbents. The flanker-brand strategy lets the Big Three compete for price-sensitive customers without lowering the parent brands' prices — the discount brand absorbs the price-shopper, and the premium brand keeps its margin.</p>
<p>The one major exception is **Freedom Mobile**, owned by Quebecor's Vidéotron — and as this article documents, Freedom exists in its current form only because the federal government forced Rogers to sell it as the price of swallowing Shaw.</p>
<h2>How it was built, part 1: the statutory wall</h2>
<p>Our June 4 piece on the streaming tax documented the architecture in detail; here is the short version.</p>
<p>Under the Telecommunications Act and Radiocommunication Act, a Canadian carrier with **10% or more market share** must be Canadian-controlled: at least **80% of voting shares Canadian-owned and 80% of board members Canadian citizens** — the "80/80 rule." The rules were loosened in 2012, but only for small players below the 10% threshold.</p>
<p>The practical effect: AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile, or any other deep-pocketed foreign carrier cannot buy one of the Big Three, and cannot build a challenger past 10% market share without surrendering control of it. Foreign competition at the scale that would actually discipline Big Three pricing is structurally foreclosed.</p>
<p>The one moment the wall was tested: in 2013, **Verizon explored entering Canada** — looking at acquiring the struggling new entrants and bidding in the 700 MHz spectrum auction. The Harper government openly welcomed it. The Big Three responded with the coordinated **"Fair for Canada" advertising and lobbying campaign**, framing the second-largest carrier in the United States as a threat to Canadian jobs and rural networks. Within months, Verizon walked. No foreign carrier of comparable scale has looked at Canada since.</p>
<h2>How it was built, part 2: every challenger got eaten</h2>
<p>Ottawa has understood the competition problem for at least 18 years — and tried to fix it by manufacturing a fourth carrier. The 2008 AWS spectrum auction **set aside spectrum that incumbents could not bid on**, and three new carriers launched on it in 2009-2010: **Wind Mobile, Mobilicity, and Public Mobile**.</p>
<p>Here is what happened to every one of them:</p>
<p>- **Public Mobile** — sold to **Telus**, October 2013. Telus now uses the name as a flanker brand.
- **Mobilicity** — filed for creditor protection in 2013 after a blocked Telus deal; sold to **Rogers** in 2015.
- **Wind Mobile** — sold to **Shaw** in 2016 and renamed Freedom Mobile.
- **MTS (Manitoba Telecom Services)** — not a 2008 entrant but Manitoba's independent fourth carrier, whose presence made Manitoba one of Canada's cheapest wireless provinces. Sold to **Bell** in 2017. Manitoba's discount eroded.
- **Shaw itself** — acquired by **Rogers** in the $26-billion merger completed in April 2023, with Freedom Mobile divested to Vidéotron as the regulatory price.</p>
<p>The pattern is total. Every carrier created or sustained as a check on the Big Three was eventually acquired by the Big Three or consolidated into the existing oligopoly structure. The set-aside policy succeeded at creating competitors and failed completely at keeping them alive.</p>
<h2>Who fought back — the honour roll, across party lines</h2>
<p>The operator-class answer to "is any politician fighting this?" is: several have tried, from every major party, plus both watchdogs. The record:</p>
<p>**The Harper Conservatives (2008-2014).** The 2008 spectrum set-asides were their policy. In 2013 they actively courted Verizon and ran on "More choices, lower prices." They lost — not to an opposition party, but to the Big Three's lobbying campaign and Verizon's cost-benefit math.</p>
<p>**The NDP (2019-2021).** Jagmeet Singh campaigned twice on **capping cell phone and internet prices**, pegging Canadian rates to global averages and mandating affordable basic plans. The NDP never held government; the pledge was never tested.</p>
<p>**The Competition Bureau (2021-2023).** Commissioner Matthew Boswell took the Rogers-Shaw merger to a full Competition Tribunal hearing — the most aggressive merger challenge in the Bureau's modern history. The Tribunal ruled against the Bureau in December 2022; the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal in January 2023. The watchdog used every legal tool it had, and lost.</p>
<p>**François-Philippe Champagne (Liberal, Industry Minister).** Approved the merger — but extracted binding conditions: **Vidéotron must hold Freedom Mobile for at least 10 years** and must offer prices in Ontario and Western Canada **comparable to its Quebec pricing, roughly 20% below incumbent levels**. Whatever one thinks of approving the merger, the conditions are the single policy act of the last decade that demonstrably moved national prices.</p>
<p>**The CRTC (2021-present).** Opened wholesale MVNO access to regional carriers; opened incumbent fibre networks to competitors in February 2025; and in March 2026 issued Telecom Regulatory Policy 2026-43, which **bans activation fees, plan-change fees, and most early-cancellation fees effective June 12, 2026** — two days after this article publishes. The CRTC estimates the switching-friction rules will save Canadians **more than $600 million per year**.</p>
<h2>The scoreboard — and the worrying turn in the data</h2>
<p>Did any of it work? Honestly: partially, recently, and possibly temporarily.</p>
<p>**The win.** After the Freedom-to-Vidéotron divestiture, a genuine price war broke out. CRTC data shows mobile prices on popular tiers **fell roughly 25-40% between 2023 and 2025**. The gap to U.S. pricing narrowed. This is the most sustained price decline in modern Canadian wireless history, and it traces directly to the Champagne conditions — a fourth carrier with mandated Quebec-level pricing, finally national.</p>
<p>**The turn.** In **October and November 2025**, Statistics Canada's CPI recorded **year-over-year cellular price increases — the first in roughly 30 months**. StatCan attributes it to weaker seasonal discounting; analysts are blunter. Ivey Business School's Erik Bohlin: the competitive period is "stabilizing." The Canadian Anti-Monopoly Project's Keldon Bester: the competitive moment may prove "more temporary than we would like."</p>
<p>Two structural facts support the pessimists. First, the subscriber-growth engine that fuelled the price war — record immigration — has slowed, reducing the incentive to compete for new customers. Second, the Vidéotron pricing condition runs **10 years from 2023**. In 2033 it expires. Nothing in current law prevents the market from re-converging on oligopoly pricing afterward — and the entire 18-year history above suggests that is the default trajectory, not the tail risk.</p>
<h2>What this adds to our streaming-tax piece</h2>
<p>Six days ago we published [the streaming-tax article](/news/streaming-tax-40-per-service-wireless-protectionism-parallel), which used Canadian wireless as the historical warning for the CRTC's new 15% streaming levy: protect a market from foreign competition, and consumers pay the differential.</p>
<p>This deep-dive sharpens that warning in one important way. The wireless story is not just "protection caused high prices." It is **"protection plus consolidation defeated every remedy."** Ottawa did not ignore the wireless problem — it attacked it repeatedly, across three governments and two decades, with spectrum set-asides, foreign-entry overtures, merger litigation, ministerial conditions, and regulatory fee bans. Almost every remedy was absorbed, outlasted, or out-lobbied by the incumbents. The single remedy that moved prices — the Vidéotron conditions — is time-limited and already showing strain in the CPI data.</p>
<p>Applied to streaming: the federal government has told the CRTC to revisit the 15% levy because of consumer-cost concerns. The wireless record says revisits, conditions, and consumer-protection rules tend to soften protected-market pricing only temporarily, while the underlying structure — who is allowed to compete — stays untouched. Watch the structure, not the press release.</p>
<p>One more parallel worth naming: in both files, the consumer-cost concession came only after the policy was locked in. In wireless, Ottawa spent years denying the price gap that its own department's studies later documented. In streaming, the government acknowledged the pass-through risk only after the CRTC had finalized the rate. The pattern is consistent: the price tag is admitted late, and paid by the same people both times.</p>
<h2>The bottom line</h2>
<p>On the documented record:</p>
<p>- Canada's wireless market is roughly 90% controlled by three companies and their flanker brands.
- The dominance was constructed by identifiable policy: foreign-ownership rules that wall out competitors at scale, and a merger-review system that ultimately approved every major consolidation put in front of it.
- Politicians and watchdogs from every major party have fought it — Harper's set-asides and Verizon overture, Singh's price-cap pledges, the Competition Bureau's two-court war, Champagne's merger conditions, the CRTC's fee bans landing June 12.
- The one remedy that worked — a mandated, price-conditioned fourth carrier — has an expiry date of 2033, and the price data already turned upward in late 2025.</p>
<p>The next chapter is being written now: whether the CRTC's June 12 switching rules let consumers punish price increases, whether the Carney government extends or strengthens the Vidéotron conditions before they lapse, and whether anyone in Parliament is willing to touch the foreign-ownership wall itself — the one structural lever no government has pulled.</p>
<p>Parliament Audit will track all three. Your MP's position on telecom competition is a matter of public record — [find yours](/find-your-mp).</p>
<hr />
<p><small>
Originally published by <a href="https://parliamentaudit.ca/news/canada-wireless-oligopoly-how-ottawa-built-it-who-fought-it">Parliament Audit</a>
under the <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND 4.0</a> license.
<img src="https://parliamentaudit.ca/api/republish-beacon?slug=canada-wireless-oligopoly-how-ottawa-built-it-who-fought-it" alt="" width="1" height="1" />
</small></p>
</article>