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Canada deserves to know.
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On March 12, 2026, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) issued Telecom Regulatory Policy 2026-43, amending the Wireless Code and the Internet Code to prohibit fees that discourage Canadians from switching plans or providers. The rules took full effect on June 12, 2026. They ban activation fees, plan-change (modification) fees, and early-cancellation fees where no subsidized device is being financed — charges that ranged from roughly $30 to $80 at the major carriers. The CRTC estimates the change will save Canadians more than $600 million per year by removing barriers to switching. A companion ruling on April 24, 2026 expanded self-service requirements: customers must be able to change or cancel cell phone and internet plans through an app, online, or by email, and providers must send written confirmation of any self-service action. The rules apply to Rogers, Bell, Telus and their flanker brands (Fido, Virgin Plus, Koodo and others) as well as regional and smaller carriers. Two things are not eliminated: outstanding device-financing balances on a subsidized phone, and reasonable physical-installation fees (relevant mainly to home internet). The ban is a concrete consumer win. The accountability point is what it implies: switching fees are friction that only persists in a market where customers have few places to go. This article documents the change, who it covers, and why — as Parliament Audit's coverage of the Big Three oligopoly and the streaming levy has detailed — removing the lock-in fees does not address the underlying concentration that keeps Canadian telecom prices high.
Canadians commonly call it the cell phone monopoly. Technically it is an oligopoly: Bell, Rogers, and Telus, together with the flanker brands they own — Fido, Chatr and Cityfone (Rogers), Koodo and Public Mobile (Telus), Virgin Plus and Lucky Mobile (Bell) — control roughly 90% of the Canadian wireless market. This article traces how that happened: the Telecommunications Act's foreign-ownership rules (the "80/80 rule" plus the 10% market-share rule) that keep foreign carriers from competing at scale; the 2008 AWS spectrum auction in which Ottawa set aside spectrum to create new competitors (Wind Mobile, Mobilicity, Public Mobile); and the decade in which every one of those entrants was absorbed — Public Mobile by Telus (2013), Mobilicity by Rogers (2015), Wind by Shaw (2016, renamed Freedom Mobile), Manitoba's MTS by Bell (2017), and finally Shaw itself by Rogers in a $26-billion merger completed in 2023. The article catalogues who has actually fought back: the Harper Conservatives' 2013 attempt to recruit Verizon (defeated by the Big Three's "Fair for Canada" lobbying campaign and Verizon's withdrawal); the NDP's price-cap pledges under Jagmeet Singh; the Competition Bureau's full-scale legal war against the Rogers-Shaw merger (lost at the Competition Tribunal in December 2022 and at the Federal Court of Appeal in January 2023); Industry Minister François-Philippe Champagne's extracted conditions (Vidéotron must hold Freedom Mobile for 10 years and price Ontario/Western plans comparably to its Quebec plans, roughly 20% below incumbent levels); and the CRTC's consumer-protection turn, including the fee bans taking effect June 12, 2026 that the regulator estimates will save Canadians more than $600 million per year. The honest scoreboard: CRTC-measured wireless prices fell roughly 25% over two years after the Vidéotron remedy — and in October and November 2025, Statistics Canada recorded the first year-over-year cellular price increases in about 30 months, suggesting the competitive window opened by the merger remedies may already be narrowing.
On May 21, 2026, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) finalized a decision tripling the mandatory contribution rate that foreign streaming services with $25 million or more in Canadian revenue must pay to Canadian-content production funds — from a 5% interim rate (set in 2024 and under court challenge) to 15%. Industry analysts estimate the pass-through cost to consumers at $1.50 to $4.00 per service per month — roughly $18 to $48 per service per year. A typical Canadian household subscribed to Netflix Premium, Disney+, Crave, and Amazon Prime Video would see an annual increase on the order of $78. The federal government has publicly acknowledged the cost is likely to fall on Canadians and has directed the CRTC to revisit the decision. The Canadian wireless industry is the most-cited domestic precedent for what happens when foreign competition is structurally excluded from a Canadian market. The Telecommunications Act and Radiocommunication Act impose ownership restrictions (the "80/80 rule": at least 80% of voting shares and at least 80% of board members must be Canadian) that, combined with a 10% market-share trigger, effectively prevent large U.S. carriers from acquiring or fully entering Canada's wireless market. The result is documented across multiple independent studies: Canada's "Big Three" carriers (Bell, Rogers, Telus) charge prices that international comparisons regularly place among the highest in the developed world. This article walks the streaming-cost analysis, the statutory wireless-protection architecture, the Verizon 2013 attempt that was effectively dissuaded by the policy environment, expert commentary from former Competition Bureau leadership, the federal government's own admission on streaming-cost passthrough, and the honest qualifiers — including that Canadian wireless prices have come down materially since 2018 and that the streaming and wireless cases are not perfectly identical.
The Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) finalized a decision on May 21, 2026 requiring foreign streaming services with more than $25 million in annual Canadian revenue to contribute 15% of those Canadian revenues to Canadian-content production funds. The rate is up from the 5% interim rate the CRTC announced in 2024. The contribution is imposed under the Online Streaming Act (Bill C-11, 2023). Affected services include Netflix, Amazon Prime Video, Disney+, Apple TV+, and Paramount+; Spotify is excluded because it is classified as audio-only rather than audiovisual. The federal government characterizes the requirement as a "regulatory contribution," not a tax — the contribution money flows to designated funds for Canadian English, French, and Indigenous content production, not to federal general revenue. Streamers (with backing from the U.S. trade representative) characterize it as a tax that will inevitably be passed to consumers through higher subscription prices. Both framings are defensible. The Constitutional law of taxation distinguishes between taxes (compulsory payments to general government revenue) and regulatory charges (compulsory payments tied to a regulated scheme); the 15% contribution is the second category, not the first. Functionally — for a household paying more for Netflix because of it — the two are indistinguishable. The article walks through who pays, who collects, where the money goes, the timeline, the legal challenges still pending in Federal Court, and the consumer-cost impact analysts expect.