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Canada deserves to know.
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2 articles
In January 2026, during Prime Minister Mark Carney's state visit to Beijing, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police signed a memorandum of understanding on law-enforcement cooperation with the People's Republic of China's Ministry of Public Security (MPS). A joint statement from Carney and Chinese President Xi Jinping said the two sides "committed to strengthening law enforcement cooperation to combat corruption and transnational crimes, including telecommunication and cyber fraud and illegal synthetic drugs." The RCMP has refused to release the full text of the agreement, stating it will not do so without the agreement of China's government — drawing demands for disclosure from both the Conservative and New Democratic parties. The MPS is the same national police body whose subordinate Fuzhou Public Security Bureau operated the clandestine "overseas police service stations" that the NGO Safeguard Defenders exposed in 2022 and that the RCMP investigated in the Greater Toronto Area and in Montreal (the RCMP closed its Montreal investigation in September 2025 without charges; the two Montreal community organizations involved have sued the RCMP for defamation and contest the characterization). The cooperation agreement was signed against the backdrop of the Hogue Commission (the federal Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference), which in its January 2025 final report found the PRC to be "by far the most significant" foreign-interference threat and documented Chinese interference in the 2019 and 2021 federal elections. A former senior RCMP officer, opposition public-safety critics, and national-security commentators have characterized the secret MPS cooperation agreement as a counterintelligence and sovereignty risk. This article documents the agreement, the institutional connection to the police stations, the election-interference findings, the official threat assessment, and the criticisms — with precise attribution and the honest caveats around the un-charged community organizations.
This article catalogues documented cases in which individuals tied to terrorism — by criminal conviction, by United Nations Security Council sanctions listing, or by the Government of Canada's own terrorist-entity designations — obtained Canadian entry, residency, or citizenship. The standard applied is deliberately strict: every named individual is either convicted of a terrorism-related offence in Canada or a peer democracy, or appears on an official terrorist list (Public Safety Canada Listed Entities, UN 1267/1989 sanctions, or the equivalent). Individuals who were accused but not convicted, or whose security certificates were later quashed by the courts, are not named as terrorists. The three principal documented cases are: (1) Mahmoud Mohammad Issa Mohammad, convicted in Greece for the 1968 PFLP attack on an El Al aircraft that killed maritime engineer Leon Shirdan, who obtained Canadian residency in 1987 by concealing his record and was finally deported in 2013 after a 26-year legal battle; (2) Ahmed Said Khadr, added to the UN 1267 al-Qaeda sanctions list in 1999 as a senior al-Qaeda financier, who held Canadian citizenship and whose family resided in Toronto — the family-members dimension is documented in detail, with each member's actual legal outcome stated precisely; and (3) the roughly 28 senior Iranian officials the Canada Border Services Agency has identified as inadmissible to Canada for ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which the Government of Canada designated a terrorist entity in June 2024 — of whom only one has been removed as of early 2026. The article documents the cases, the screening failures that allowed them, the immigration-law provisions that govern inadmissibility, and the honest caveats around each.